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Death to Death 




  Descartes’ philosophy is instructive in revealing and resolving a puzzle about death. Specifically, it 
is the puzzle of carving a concept of death out from an ontologically sparse metaphysics of matter 
that does not provide a clear and obvious grounding for a concept of life. As I argue in this paper, 
we ultimately find resolution to this puzzle in Descartes’ philosophy once we realize that we should 
stop looking for the nature of death in his metaphysics of matter; it does not exist there, and it has 
no grounding there. In reality, death is nothing to no thing for Descartes. Furthermore, I recommend 
that Descartes’ lesson applies to attempts in the contemporary scholarship of the philosophy of 
death to analyze death as a materialist concept and, in doing so, it stands to dissolve the debate 





The philosophy of René Descartes stands at an intersection of attitudes in 
contemporary discussions on the nature of life and death. On one hand, the soul 
is given very little significance in these discussions. When it does come up in 
the literature, the comments against it are often swift and damning;1 when it is 
not addressed outright, its denial is still often implied.2 So it is that Descartes’ 
conception of the immortal soul is largely ignored or rebuked by contemporary 
scholars, and his philosophy of substance dualism that grounds it is widely 
rebuffed by those who reject the nature, existence, and mere suggestion of the 
soul as distinct from the body.  
On the other hand, just as a silence about souls is now standard in the 
scholarship of the philosophy of death, so too is the explanation: materialism.3 
                                                      
* Associate Professor, Humanities Department, MacEwan University, Room 7-352G, 10700 104 
Avenue, Edmonton, Alberta T5J 4S2, Canada. Email: millss5[a]macewan.ca.  
1 For example, see Baker (2001), p. 178, or Pojman (1992), p. 159. 
2 For example, the rejection of the soul is implied by the termination thesis. For more on this thesis 
itself, see Feldman (1992), chapter 6, and (2000).  
3 DiSilvestro (2012), p. 481, p. 497. Although DiSilvestro does incorporate the soul into his 
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In this respect, contemporary philosophy of life and death owes much to 
Descartes. He is one of the most renowned and celebrated contributors to the 
modern materialistic approach to nature, and that recognition includes his 
significant influence on the rise of the mechanical concept of the human body.4 
This concept is that of the human body as a machine, whereby every part, 
function, and change is because of the matter and lawful motion of the body as 
simply that: body. According to Descartes, there is nothing more to account for 
about the human body’s physiology because there is nothing more to the human 
body; the soul—as per his dualism—is an entirely separate substance. Simply 
put, substance dualism affords Descartes his conception of the human body—or, 
more accurately, all living bodies—as complex material machines.5 This is at 
the bedrock of his status as “the founder of modern materialism”6 and of 
materialism of life more particularly. And yet, Descartes’ analysis of the 
concepts of life and death are given little attention by modern materialists. 
However, if they were given their due consideration in contemporary 
scholarship, an important and relevant lesson would come to light.  
 
2. Aim of This Paper 
 
Despite a widespread acceptance of materialism, contemporary philosophers 
struggle to analyze the concepts of life and death. It is with an eye to Descartes’ 
legacy concerning the mechanization of nature, that I set out in this paper to 
examine what happens to the concept of death when materialism banishes souls 
from the picture. Specifically, the question that concerns me is this: What is the 
nature of death for a material, complex, living body? In other words—words 
consistent with a puzzle within Descartes’ philosophy—the question is: What is 
the death of a living machine?  
At issue in my examination of this question is a puzzle of accounting for the 
concept of death within a materialist metaphysics. In particular, it is the puzzle 
of carving out a concept of death from an ontologically sparse metaphysics of 
matter that does not provide a clear and obvious grounding for a concept of life. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
examination of quality of life assessments in medical decision-making, he acknowledges that it is a 
rare move to include the soul in contemporary death scholarship and, in doing so, directly confronts 
the paucity of souls in the literature.  
4 King (1978), p. 23. 
5 Bedau (2008), p. 456. 
6 Easton (2011), p. 203.  
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As I argue in this paper, the puzzle is ultimately resolved in Descartes’ 
philosophy by the recognition that we should stop looking for the concept of 
death in a metaphysics of matter; it does not exist there. In reality, death is 
nothing to no thing for Descartes.  
As I further aim to show in this paper, Descartes’ lesson of dissolving the 
concept of death applies directly to certain problems and debates in 
contemporary scholarship on the nature of death.7 To that end, I begin this 
paper with those problems and debates in order to set the scene for the relevance 
and resolution that Descartes provides. I return to those same issues after laying 
out my analysis and argument of Descartes’ concept of death as an extrinsic 
denomination.   
 
3. The Enigma of a Materialist Conceptual Analysis of Death  
 
In his book Confrontations with the Reaper, Fred Feldman makes a 
compelling case for the difficulty of defining death. In particular, Feldman 
attempts to provide a materialist biological conceptual analysis of death, but is 
ultimately unsuccessful. As he specifies, a materialist conception is one that 
does not explain death by anything more than matter because there is nothing 
more to mortal things than matter. He writes, “[I]n the materialist conception, 
life and death are properties of material objects. Living zygotes, fetuses, human 
beings, and human corpses are equally material objects. The vital differences 
among these things are primarily due to their structures and capacities. At 
bottom, however, we are all just material objects.”8 As such, Feldman does not 
distinguish among different types of matter for different types of living things; 
rather, he treats all matter as the same material stuff, be it the stuff that 
composes a human being, a bird, a tree, or any other thing. On a related note, 
Feldman contends that there is only a single concept of what death is for every 
and all things that die. He refers to this as the biological concept of death.9  
In that Feldman seeks a materialist and biological account of death as a 
conceptual analysis of death, it means that he investigates the very nature of 
death and not the criterion (or criteria) of death. To highlight that distinction and 
                                                      
7 I borrow this terminology from Hutchin’s argument for Descartes’ “dissolution of life” (2016). 
8 Feldman (1992), p. 112.  
9 Feldman (1992), pp. 19-20. In his own words: “I do not believe that there is a special concept of 
death applicable only to people. I do not believe that the word ‘died’ has a sense for which it would be 
a necessary truth that if a thing dies, then it must have been a person” (p. 20).  
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clarify his target, Feldman specifies that an analysis of death 
  
1. purports to tell us what death is; 
2. must apply equally to anything that can die; 
3. is necessarily true, if true at all, and there cannot be even so much as a 
possible falsifying instance; 
4. is eternally true, if true at all; and 
5. is a success if it is true – even if no one adopts it.10  
 
Further to the distinction that Feldman draws between a conceptual analysis and 
criterion, he explains that “the analytical project has a sort of conceptual priority 
over the criterial project.”11 Essentially, to define death by its criteria is to 
assume what death is, but what is that? 
As a starting point for the conceptual project of defining death, Feldman 
works from a definition of death that he calls “the standard analysis” and which 
he presents as follows: 
 
x dies at t = df. x ceases to be alive at t12  
 
Unpacking this with the above-outlined components of a conceptual analysis, 
the standard analysis of death tells us that death necessarily, always, and for all 
mortal things is the cessation of life—whether we think so or not—though it 
seems safe to agree with Feldman that it is “standard” to think so. Simply put, 
the standard analysis of death is the view that death just is the end of life. 
However, in its simplicity, the standard analysis is doomed to criticisms; 
Feldman elaborates on one of them by systematically hashing out a number of 
counterexamples in which organisms cease to be alive without dying. Despite 
his attempts to reinforce the standard analysis against a falsifying case, he is 
ultimately unsuccessful, and while there is an argument to be made that the flaw 
in Feldman’s way of assessing the standard analysis of death is that he assumes 
that the counterexamples are, in fact, counterexamples, there nevertheless is a 
                                                      
10 Feldman (1992), p. 17. See also Gervais (1987) and (1989). For example, the debate over whether 
death occurs at the cessation of brain activity or cardio-circulatory activity is a debate over two criteria 
rather than two concepts of death, since not all living things that die have brains or hearts and lungs. 
11 Feldman (1992), p. 18. See also Gervais (1989), p. 18. In addition, Bedau [(2008), p. 468] makes a 
complementary case for the prioritization of the concept of life over life’s criteria. 
12 Feldman (1992), p. 62. 
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deeper problem with the standard analysis that is not so easy to dispatch with. It 
is the problem of analyzing the concept of life.  
A successful analysis must not make use of any obscure or circular terms, 
which, in the case of the standard analysis of death, puts the attention on the 
term “alive.” If it is obscure, then it will “import” that obscurity into the 
standard analysis and, indeed, any analysis of death in which it appears.13 So, 
what is life? Feldman calls life “enigmatic,” and he is not alone in his 
assessment.14 Given that, there are grounds to criticize the standard analysis for 
its burden-shifting opacity; it trades the mystery of death for the perplexing 
nature of life. 15  To quote Feldman: “The Reaper remains mysterious.” 16 
Whether we approach a concept of death directly or via the concept of life, death 
is an enigma—“it is impossible to formulate a fully satisfactory philosophy 
analysis of the concept of death.”17  
However, despite that conclusion, Feldman is willing to commit to a 
materialist conceptual scheme about death and to contend that death involves the 
breakdown of the complex, well organized, constantly changing physical 
systems of living things.18 In a particularly notable section of his book, he 
argues from that materialist concept to the conclusion that living things typically 
survive their deaths. Feldman is a self-proclaimed “survivalist” (specifically, a 
corpse survivalist) who argues that one survives death so long as one’s 
biological identity is left intact.19 In making this argument, Feldman is a key 
contributor to the debate between the annihilation thesis and the survival thesis, 
which also includes arguments from (and counter-arguments against) Jay 





                                                      
13 Feldman (1992), p. 56.  
14 Ibid. See also Bedau (2008), p. 466.  
15 Feldman (1992), p. 20. 
16 Ibid, p. 71. 
17 Ibid, p. 125. 
18 Ibid, pp. 106-7, p. 112. Feldman’s materialist concept of death lays the foundation for his corpse 
survivalist thesis, according to which death is not the annihilation of a formerly living thing; the thing 
survives so long as its corpse remains intact.   
19 See Feldman (1992), chapters 6 and 7, and Feldman (2000). 
20 See Rosenberg (1998), chapter 1. 
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4. A Materialist Conception of Death 
 
Jay Rosenberg’s account of death starts from the position of the standard 
analysis. As he writes in his book Thinking Clearly about Death, “Death is the 
end of life. More particularly, death is the loss of life. To understand the nature 
of death—what death is—then, we need to understand the nature of what life 
is.” 21  So, once again an analysis of death leads to an analysis of life. 
Nevertheless, the enigma remains.  
According to Rosenberg, life is a condition that belongs to material bodies 
that have an intricate, complexly nested, organic structure of elements. 22 
Delving deeper into this organic nature of living things, Rosenberg explains that 
“The distinction between ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’ matter … is not the 
distinction between two distinct kinds of stuffs but rather the distinction between 
two ways in which stuffs of the same kinds—atoms of various elements—can be 
arranged or structured.”23 As such, living organisms and inorganic objects do 
not differ on account of what they are made out of, but rather, on how that 
matter is arranged. However, noting that a living organism and a non-living 
fresh corpse can have very similar material constituents and structural 
arrangements, Rosenberg concludes that the essential difference between the 
structures of living and non-living things is in what the former can do that the 
latter cannot do.24 Specifically, a living organism, unlike a corpse, has “the 
ability, capacity, or capability to preserve its intricate material organization 
through ongoing (physical, chemical) transactions with its environment.”25 In 
short, living organisms are what Rosenberg calls “syntropic.”26    
Rosenberg’s definition of death meets the metaphysical mark of strict 
materialism in that he explicitly rejects any nonphysical explanation for the 
syntropic capacity of organisms, denouncing any explanatory appeal to things 
such as “souls” or “minds” in order to make sense of the world. To that point, 
                                                      
21 Ibid, p. 159.  
22 Ibid, p. 160.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, pp. 160-1. 
25 Ibid, p. 161. 
26 Rosenberg defines a “syntropic thing” as a physical thing that is able to “preserve its initial 
organization and structure or even tend in the direction of greater and more intricate arrangements of 
constituent elements” while undergoing “continuous causal interaction with its environment” ([1998], 
p. 162). Rosenberg contrasts this with “entropic” things, which lose their structure and organization (p. 
162). He classifies living organisms as the former and rocks and corpses as the latter (p. 162). 
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Rosenberg writes,   
 
It is a classical failing and confusion in human history that we so 
frequently attempt to account for a striking or impressive features of the 
things we encounter by, in essence, postulating some special entity (a 
‘nonphysical’ ‘soul’ or ‘mind,’ an ‘élan vital,’ or something equally 
mysterious) to ‘explain’ it. We attempt to turn abilities which we cannot 
otherwise account for into things or stuffs or forces—about which we 
can then say, however, only that they are the mysterious something, 
whatever it is, that accounts for the abilities.27 
 
Instead, according to Rosenberg:  
 
[T]he abilities, capacities, and competences of a thing are properly to be 
accounted for, not by the mysterious presence of some mysterious and 
extraordinary constituent thing or stuff, but by the way in which the 
perfectly ordinary constituent things or stuffs which compose the 
talented original are structured or arranged—by the organization and 
modes of functioning or operations of perfectly ordinary material 
constituents. It is the shape of an airplane’s wings, for example, which 
accounts for its ability to get off the ground—not some antigravitational 
materials or an ‘aeronautical soul’ which ‘strives for the heights.’28 
 
It is against this soulless, materialist backdrop that Rosenberg explains what 
death is: “It is not ‘the separation of the soul from the body.’ It is the loss of 
syntropic capacity or ability—the loss of a (purely physical) ability to do 
something.”29 To put it plainly: death is a body’s loss of the soulless, purely 
mechanical capacity for self-preservation. Just a page later in his book, 
Rosenberg qualifies this account: “Death is the loss of syntropic capacity or 
ability. More precisely, an organism dies when it loses its power to preserve and 
sustain its self-organizing organization permanently and irreversibly.”30 When 
that occurs, a change of a natural kind takes place: the living thing ceases to 
                                                      
27 Ibid, p. 161. 
28 Ibid, p. 162.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid, p. 163. 
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exist and a corpse comes into existence.31 There is no surviving death.   
At this point, one may pause, reminded of Feldman’s attempts to patch and 
protect the standard analysis against counterexamples. Among those ultimately 
unsuccessful attempts, Feldman considers Rosenberg’s account that death is the 
permanent and irreversible cessation of life, and then proceeds to draw up a case 
to illustrate what is “surely” wrong about it, namely that permanence and 
irreversibility are not sufficient for death; the physical impossibility of 
revitalization is necessary as well.32 With that, the burden shifts again, and we 
are back to death’s mystery. 
Yet, rather than then tread down this path of puzzles over the enigma of 
death as the end of life, I propose a different—but, in fact, old—puzzle with the 
materialist analysis of the concept of death. That is the puzzle of Descartes’ 
conception of death.   
 
5. Descartes on Death 
 
Of the many philosophical thoughts that Descartes is famous for, he is not 
well known for his thoughts on death. Nevertheless, one does not have to go any 
further than the Meditations on First Philosophy to discover some of those 
thoughts, starting with the fact that the book was first published in 1641 with the 
subtitle “in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the immortality of 
the soul.” One year later, it was published with the new subtitle “in which are 
demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul 
and the body,” which is more accurate given that Descartes does not, in fact, 
properly argue for the soul’s immortality in the Meditations, but it is also not 
entirely unrelated to that originally stated objective.  
Descartes explains in the Synopsis to the Meditations that his demonstration 
of the soul’s and body’s distinctness is the foundation for a proof of the 
immortality of the soul. That demonstration of the real distinction between soul 
and body occurs in the Sixth Meditation when Descartes argues that the 
meditating “I” is a thinking, non-extended thing that is capable of being 
separated from its extended, non-thinking body, and, thus, can exist without it.33 
                                                      
31 Ibid, pp. 182-3. 
32 Feldman (1992), p. 65. 
33 Meditations, CSM II, p. 54; AT 7:78. The abbreviations used to refer to Descartes’ writings are: 
CSM I & II = The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volumes I & II; CSMK = The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes: The Correspondences; AT = Oeuvres de Descartes. 
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Although this paves the way to an argument for the immortality of the soul, 
Descartes acknowledges that he does not complete the argument in the 
Meditations: “because the premisses [sic] which lead to the conclusion that the 
soul is immortal depend on an account of the whole of physics.”34 In particular, 
we need to know more about the generation and corruption of substances in 
order to know that the soul is immortal. Descartes continues, 
 
First, we need to know that absolutely all substances, or things which 
must be created by God in order to exist, are by their nature incorruptible 
and cannot ever cease to exist unless they are reduced to nothingness by 
God’s denying his concurrence to them. Secondly, we need to recognize 
that body, taken in the general sense, is a substance, so that it too never 
perishes. But the human body, in so far as it differs from other bodies, is 
simply made up of a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents 
of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of any accidents in 
this way, but is a pure substance. For even if all the accidents of the 
mind change, so that it has different objects of the understanding and 
different desires and sensations, it does not on that account become a 
different mind; whereas a human body loses its identity merely as a 
result of a change in the shape of some of its parts.35 
 
From there, he claims, the argument is complete: “And it follows from this that 
while the body can very easily perish, the mind is immortal by its very nature.”36 
This is a very rich passage for understanding Descartes on death. Not only does 
it complete the argument for the immortality of the soul, it reveals some of the 
crucial pieces of the puzzle about the death of the body. In keeping with my aim 
concerning the materialist account of death, I will put Descartes’ argument for 
the immortality of the soul to the side, focusing here and now on the puzzle that 
is his concept of the body’s death.    
Concerning Descartes’ conception of the death of the body, the passage 
from the Synopsis to the Meditations reveals that death befalls particular 
composite bodies and not body in general. For Descartes, body in general (i.e., 
bodily substance or corporeal substance at large) is a plenum of created, 
                                                      
34 Synopsis to the Meditations, CSM II, p. 10; AT 7:13-14.  
35 Ibid, p. 10; AT 7:14. 
36 Ibid. 
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extended, non-thinking substance that makes up the entire material world.37 
There is no variation in the material world; all matter is extension, i.e., length, 
breadth, and depth. Furthermore, all material change is consistent with that 
extended nature. So, while body in general is changeable into innumerable size, 
shapes, and motions, none of those changes destroy it. It is still the same 
material substance persisting through changing modes of extension in the same 
way that a soul, i.e., an immaterial substance, persists through changing thoughts. 
In reality, both of the substances in Descartes’ metaphysical dualism are 
naturally indestructible; no natural change destroys either. Simply put, this is 
because any natural change is in keeping with the substance’s nature. As 
Descartes writes in the passage from the Synopsis quoted above, first, all 
substances are by their natures incorruptible, and second, “body, taken in the 
general sense, is a substance, so that it too never perishes.”38  
However, while there is no natural annihilation and death of bodily 
substance, Descartes goes on to explain in the rest of the Synopsis passage that a 
human body qua a particular body does perish and die, and that occurs as a 
result of natural change to the shape and parts of the “certain configuration of 
limbs and other accidents”39 that make it up. In other words, death is the 
decomposition of a living body. It is the loss of that particular body’s structural 
integrity. The puzzling question, then, is how that differs from the 
decomposition of a non-living body. What distinguishes living things from 
non-living things in Descartes’ philosophy such that the former really does live 
and die, and the latter does not?  
In order to appreciate this puzzle over Descartes’ conception of death, we 
must understand certain aspects of Descartes’ philosophy and, in particular, his 
natural philosophy. Central to Descartes’ natural philosophy is his mechanical 
model of nature.  In turn, central to that mechanization of nature is his adamant 
rejection of explanatory appeals to the presence or powers of immaterial forces 
to account for the changes and activities that occur in living bodies. He drives 
that point through in Treatise on Man, where he describes numerous operations 
of the human body as if the body was “nothing but a statue or machine.”40 From 
this he then concludes, “In order to explain these functions, then, it is not 
                                                      
37 See Principles of Philosophy II.22, CSM I, p. 232; AT 8A:52-53. 
38 Synopsis, CSM II, p. 10; AT 7:14. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p. 99; AT 11:120. 
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necessary to conceive of this machine as having any vegetative or sensitive soul 
or other principle of movement and life, apart from its blood and its spirits, 
which are agitated by the heat of the fire burning continuously in its heart – a 
fire which has the same nature as all the fires that occur in inanimate bodies.”41  
Descartes’ rejection of non-material causes in the material world follows 
from his metaphysics of soul-body dualism. Once Descartes severs ties between 
soul and body, he is left to explain and account for the entire material world 
solely in terms of the sizes, shapes, and motions of extended matter. So it is that 
Descartes’ descriptions of the functions of organic bodies often include 
comparisons to the operations of artificial machines. However, his frequent 
analogies between the parts and operations of the human body and the parts and 
operations of artificial machines are no mere illustrative shortcuts. 
Fundamentally, organic bodies and artificial machines are made out of the same 
material substance and change in size, shape, and motion in accordance with the 
same laws of nature. 42  Without recourse to souls, substantial forms, or 
non-material essences, Descartes describes the death of an organic body in the 
same terms that a mechanic describes the breakdown of a machine:  
 
[L]et us note that death never occurs through the absence of the soul, but 
only because one of the principal parts of the body decays. And let us 
recognize that the difference between the body of a living man and that 
of a dead man is just like the difference between, on the one hand, a 
watch or other automaton (that is, a self-moving machine) when it is 
wound up and contains in itself the corporeal principle of the movements 
for which it is designed, together with everything else required for its 
operation; and, on the other hand, the same watch or machine when it is 
broken and the principle of its movement ceases to be active.43  
 
The soul is not the cause of death just as it is not the cause of a living body’s 
activities. Rather, the life and death of an organic body are mechanical events in 
a complex, composite machine. So it is that Descartes compares the death of a 
living body to the destruction of a watch: both events are the result of matter in 
                                                      
41 Ibid, p. 108; AT 11:202. 
42 As for the source and laws of the motion of matter, Descartes attributes them to God, whose 
perfection entails immutability and consistency in the laws (Principles II.36, CSM I, p. 240; AT 
8A:62). 
43 Passions of the Soul I.6, CSM I, p. 329; AT 11:330-1. 
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lawful motion. Yet surely—one may want to insist—a human body really does 
die, whereas a watch does not for the watch was never really alive, and thus 
never really ceased to live.  
 
6. Descartes on Life 
 
The answer to the question, “What is Descartes’ conception of death?” lies 
in wait of an answer to the question, “What is Descartes’ conception of life?” 
Indeed, as a natural philosopher and life scientist, Descartes had a deep interest 
in life phenomena.44 He wrote extensively on the functions of organic bodies 
and had a great interest in medicine, even professing that the aim of his studies 
was the preservation of health.45 The difficulty with the question of what his 
concept of life is, as Ann Wilbur MacKenzie has correctly pointed out, is that 
Descartes did not provide a systematic and general analysis of what it is for 
something to be alive.46 What is more, attempts to construct a concept out of his 
philosophy come up short.  
Take Descartes’ most explicit statement on life. In Passions of the Soul, he 
claims that the heat in the heart is the internal source of life and that death is that 
heat’s extinction.47 However, Descartes also claims that heat—which he calls “a 
fire without light”48—is no different in its material substance and lawful motion 
than any other heat. In that case, the life source in a human body is no different 
than the motive source in a steam engine or any number of other artificial 
machines. Hence, the heat in the heart does not differentiate between living and 
non-living complex bodies. Furthermore, if the distinction is secured by the fact 
that heat is in the heart of living bodies, then plants are not alive. So the puzzle 
of Descartes’ conception of death deepens without a clear and obvious analysis 
of life. Motion from an internal heat source is too broad to distinguish living and 
non-living things, and motion from the heat of the heart is too narrow.  
According to Fred Ablondi, the difference for Descartes is in the complexity 
that living things have—and only living things have—on account of being 
                                                      
44 See Detlefsen (2016). 
45 October 1645, CSMK, p. 275; AT 4:328.  
46 MacKenzie (1975), pp. 2-3.  
47 Passions I.8, CSM I, p. 331; AT 11:333. See also 5 February 1649, CSMK, p. 366; AT 5:278. 
48 Discourse on the Method, CSM I, p. 134; AT 6:46. In following, he explains that this heat has a 
“nature...no different from that of the fire which heats hay when it has been stored before it is dry, or 
which causes new wine to seethe when it is left to ferment from the crushed grapes.” 
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created by “the hands of God.”49  Indeed, it easily seems that Descartes’ 
conception of life is as simple as origin: artificial, non-living machines are 
man-made, while living bodies are God-made. Yet that will not do, for God 
created complex bodies that are not living; thus, the distinction between living 
and non-living bodies is not secured by origin.50 However, Ablondi has a 
response to that problem. He emphasizes the complexity of living bodies as one 
that only God can create, and reasons that the living bodies have a complexity 
that is special in “kind” from non-living bodies.51  
The Synopsis passage quoted above confirms that Descartes conceives of 
death as a change in kind, that is, as a change from a particular living body 
composed of extended parts configured in a certain way. In that passage, he 
describes it as a loss of identity, which suggests that it is the destruction of an 
individual, a unity. To that point, consider as well Descartes’ description of the 
human body from the Passions of the Soul: “For the body is a unity which is in a 
sense indivisible because of the arrangement of its organs, these being so related 
to one another that the removal of any one of them renders the whole body 
defective.”52  
Descartes’ comparison of living bodies and machine bodies provides insight 
into what bodily unity amounts to for him. A watch, for example, is unified on 
account of the configuration of its parts that are properly arranged when they 
fulfill the function of telling time. Until that moment when all the parts come 
together and tell time, there is no watch, and if those parts were to fall apart, 
there is no watch; there are parts are both scenarios, but no unified body that is a 
watch. Following Descartes’ comparison along that point, a living body is a 
unity of the parts and structures that a body ought to have in order to function as 
alive. That function unifies, individuates, and is the standard of life and death for 
living bodies just as the time-telling function of a watch unifies, individuates, 
and is the standard for whether watches are well-functioning or broken.53 Put 
thusly, being a living body is a question of functioning as one.  
Along this line, MacKenzie renders Descartes’ analysis of life as follows: “x 
is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts which (together with motion) 
                                                      
49 Ablondi (1998) quotes Descartes’ use of this phrase in Discourse on Method (CSM I, p. 139; AT 
6:56) and Treatise on Man (CSM I, p. 99; AT 11:120).  
50 Detlefsen (2016), p. 148. 
51 Ablondi (1998), p. 184.  
52 CSM I, p. 339; AT 11:351. 
53 See Hatfield (1992), p. 361.  
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enables x to execute a certain set of functions, F.”54 As for exactly which life 
functions belong to the set of functions proper to living bodies, Descartes does 
not provide an exact list, and MacKenzie is left to speculate and suggests 
nutrition, growth, and generation.55 To that list, Karen Detlefsen adds that the 
growth is of bodily transformation, not aggregation, as well as two more life 
functions: environmental responsiveness and self-maintenance.56 The point to 
emphasize, however, is that whatever the life functions are, those functions 
unify the parts of the body into one living whole. In other words, so long as it 
functions as a living thing, it is a living thing. However, if a complex body does 
not have the composition for performing those functions, it is not a living body. 
Indeed, it is also not a body.   
  
7. Descartes on Corpses 
 
Death, for Descartes, is the end of life, and as we have just seen, the end of 
life is the cessation of a living body’s well-functioning and, hence, its functional 
unity. At death, a living body no longer has the complex configuration of parts 
to fulfill the life functions proper to living things: it ceases to be alive, it dies, 
and it—i.e., the kind of thing with a particular assortment of pieces of matter 
unified into an individual structure by the common purpose of its parts and 
structure—ceases to exist.  
What exists after death is not the well-functioning unified body that lived. 
That perishes when a living body loses its functional identity on account of a 
defect in its composition and arrangement of parts. What remains after death is 
the matter that made up the formerly-living thing. That extension does not go 
out of existence, so what does it compose after death? Does the extension of the 
formerly-living body compose a new particular body? Specifically, is the corpse 
a kind of unified body?  
There are many reasons within Descartes’ philosophy that lead to the 
conclusion that what exists after death is not a body, i.e., that corpses are not 
things in a metaphysically robust sense. For one, there are no longer life 
functions that individuate the corpse matter as a single composite body. For 
another, the matter that survives death is the same extended substance that 
                                                      
54 MacKenzie (1975), p. 7. 
55 Ibid, p. 8. 
56 Detlefsen (2016), pp. 151-3. 
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composes the entire material universe, so a unique type of matter does not 
individuate it. For yet another, there is no soul or substantial form that informs 
and individuates the material of a corpse. And finally, the entire material 
universe is an expanse of extension. Where there is length, breadth, and 
depth—in short, where there is space, even so-called “empty” space—there is 
bodily substance. In Descartes’ words, “the nature of a body is exactly the same 
as that constituting the nature of a space.”57 As a consequence, there are no 
vacuums or gaps that separate out the shape and motions of a corpse from the 
matter and modes of extension in general. Rather, the matter that once composed 
the organism is absorbed at death into the plenum of bodily substance in general. 
Nevertheless, Descartes does write of “dead bodies.”58 Perhaps, then, dead is a 
functional kind like living is. However, it is not obvious that Descartes believes 
that it is, reserving his talk of “functions” and “uses” for living and non-living 
automata, which corpses are not.59 Yet, a closer look at Descartes on functions 
reveals that, even then, it is still just talk. That is, for Descartes, functional kinds 
are not real kinds. That is to say that there is, properly speaking, no such thing as 
dead or living bodies for Descartes—at least not in a metaphysically robust 
sense.  
 
8. Death as the Cessation of Extrinsically Denominated Functions 
 
The puzzle of Descartes’ conception of death reaches greater perplexing 
depths in light of his remarks in the Sixth Meditation about the nature of a 
well-functioning body. It is a long, yet important passage, worth quoting at 
length. 
 
[A] clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of 
its nature just as closely when it is badly made and tells the wrong time 
as when it completely fulfils the wishes of the clockmaker. In the same 
way, I might consider the body of a man as a kind of machine equipped 
with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in 
such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still perform 
                                                      
57 Principles II.11, CSM I, p. 227; AT 8A:46. 
58 For example, Passions I.5, CSM I, p. 329; AT 11:330. 
59 For an insightful analysis of the medical context of Descartes’ teleological language, see 
Distelzweig (2015).  
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all the same movements as it does in those cases where movement is not 
under the control of the will or, consequently, of the mind. I can easily 
see that if such a body suffers from dropsy, for example, and is affected 
by the dryness of the throat which normally produces in the mind the 
sensation of thirst, the resulting condition of the nerves and other parts 
will dispose the body to take a drink, with the result that the disease will 
be aggravated. Yet this is just as natural as the body’s being stimulated 
by a similar dryness of the throat to take a drink, when there is no such 
illness and the drink is beneficial. Admittedly, when I consider the 
purpose of the clock, I may say that it is departing from its nature when 
it does not tell the right time; and similarly when I consider the 
mechanism of the human body, I may think that, in relation to the 
movements which normally occur in it, it too is deviating from its nature 
if the throat is dry when drinking is not beneficial to its continued health. 
But I am well aware that ‘nature’ as I have just used it has a very 
different significant from ‘nature’ in the other sense. As I have just used 
it, ‘nature’ is simply a label which depends on my thought; it is quite 
extraneous to the things to which it is applied, and depends simply on 
my comparison between the idea of a sick man and a badly-made clock, 
and the idea of a healthy man and a well-made clock. But by ‘nature’ in 
the other sense I understand something which is really to be found in the 
things themselves; in this sense, therefore, the term contains something 
of the truth.60  
 
In this passage, Descartes explains that the nature of a human body is the same 
as the nature of a clock. Specifically, both are, metaphysically speaking, really 
just matter in lawful motion. Now, we may say that the nature of a clock is to 
tell time and, accordingly, we may say that a clock functions well when it tells 
the time accurately. Likewise, a clock is broken when it does not; but in truth, 
the time-telling function of a clock is just a label that we ascribe to certain 
shapes and motions in the material world. As Descartes explains, the functional 
nature of a timepiece is nothing but an extrinsic denomination. The real, intrinsic 
nature of a clock is its metaphysical nature as an extended body; it is the 
material substance that composes a portion of the material universe that we call 
                                                      
60 Meditations, CSM II, 58-9; AT 7:84-85. 
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“a clock.” However, that extrinsically determined portion of matter is not really 
directed at the goal of telling the time.61 In reality, it is nothing but matter that 
moves in accordance with the laws of motion. While we may think that the 
structure and movements of a working clock function well, and that the structure 
and movements of a broken clock malfunction, in essence there is no difference. 
In accordance with their bodily nature, a broken clock obeys the same laws of 
motion as a working clock. So it is with the health of a human body. According 
to Descartes, we may say that the human body is healthy or sick when it does 
not function the way that it should. Likewise, we may say that is it alive and 
running well, or is dying and breaking down, or is broken down and dead, but 
the functional nature implied in these claims is nothing but a label that we 
ascribe to the human body. In reality, the human body—like a clock—is matter 
in lawful motion. There is no particular size, shape, or speed of motion that the 
material substance of the human body ought to take; there are no functions that 
it ought to perform, and there are no life functions that properly belong to it. The 
measure of the human body’s well-functioning, well-being, malfunctions, and so 
on, is a standard of our creation and not a nature that belongs to it intrinsically.62 
The human body, too, is nothing but matter that moves in accordance with the 
laws of motion, and it obeys those laws whether it is moving in a way that we 
call healthy or sick, or what we call alive or dead. 
Thus, for Descartes, living is not a real functional kind for bodies. In other 
words, life is not an intrinsic denomination of bodies. Rather, the intrinsic 
denomination of bodies—all bodies—is extension. That is true of what we call 
living bodies and what we call corpses. Consequently, death is not a change in 
real kind. Rather, life and death are just our labels for classifying bodies.63 They 
are not concepts that pick out anything within a metaphysics of matter in lawful 
                                                      
61 Detlefsen (2016), p. 161. 
62 Detlefsen disagrees and argues that wholly material Cartesian bodies can have derivative natures 
that include internal ends; however, she also recognizes metaphysical and epistemological hurdles to 
this interpretation of Descartes’ conception of living bodies ([2016], see pp. 154-163). 
63 Manning acknowledges but also challenges the reading of “extrinsic denominations” as arbitrary 
and extraneous labels, calling it a “serious misinterpretation” ([2013], p. 252). Through an 
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health, Manning argues that the human body’s corruptible nature is not without foundation (p. 252). 
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grounds extrinsic denominations on Manning’s interpretation is sufficient to exclude his interpretation 
as a foundation for the concept of life within an austere materialist metaphysics and to serve the 
purpose of this paper. 
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motion. There simply is no grounding for them in such a metaphysics.   
Such is the ultimate outcome of the puzzle over Descartes’ conception of 
death: there is no death. His metaphysics of matter precludes that any body ever 
really dies, for to die is to cease to live, and no body ever really lives. In a recent 
paper, Barnaby Hutchins makes this point thusly: “There is nowhere in 
Descartes’ ontology for a concept of life to reside.”64 As the Sixth Meditation 
passage reveals, the life functions are merely ascribed by us to certain complex 
bodies, which means that, in fact, living bodies are not really individual bodies 
with life functions proper to them at all. Instead, the functional unity of their 
parts is based on natures and purposes that we assign to the material world. For 
Descartes, there are no true living bodies; thus, there are no living bodies that 
truly die.  
 
9. Descartes’ Lesson 
 
In order to appreciate how Descartes’ puzzle and resulting conception of the 
death of a living body-machine pertains to the contemporary attempts at 
defining death, consider these points of agreement between Descartes and 
Rosenberg. First, for both, there is no difference in the “stuff” that comprises a 
living body and the “stuff” that comprises any other body. Bodies are simply 
material things. Second, Descartes—like Rosenberg—rejects the presence or 
powers of souls in order to explain the operations of living bodies. Third, both 
conceive of death as the cessation of life functions.   
Putting these considerations about Descartes’ philosophy together, the 
lesson about defining death is this: in a single substance materialist ontology, no 
living thing really dies because no thing is ever really a living thing in the first 
place. It is a lesson to accompany Descartes’ legacy for his mechanistic 
philosophy of nature. That makes it a legacy that Rosenberg—or, more 
generally, anyone who analyzes death within a materialist framework—should 
agree with or, at the very least, seriously contemplate before assuming that the 
puzzle over the concept of death is death’s enigmatic nature, as opposed to its 
ontologically baseless non-nature.  
For example, the debate over the possibility of surviving death would end 
                                                      
64 Hutchins (2016), p. 157. Hutchins argues that MacKenzie, Ablondi, and Detlefsen are wrong to 
attempt to reduce Descartes’ concept of life because it is rather the case that Descartes “dissolves” or 
eliminates the concept of life.  
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very quickly on the point that there is no living thing in the first place, for then 
there is no thing that either terminates at death or survives death. Yet both sides 
of that debate tend to focus on the question of the identity of the corpse. 
Survivalists argue that the corpse is identical to the formerly-living biological 
organism, whereas terminators argue that the corpse is a new thing that came 
from the formerly living biological organism, but both sides simply 
accept—without question—that some living, material, composite, biological 
being exists prior to death. Nevertheless, the debate would very well come to an 
end if there were no argument to resist Descartes’ lesson that nothing happens to 
a living thing when it dies because the living thing never existed.  
A pointed case against Descartes’ lesson actually comes from a strikingly 
similar view. Here is Eric Olson’s description of that view:  
 
[There is a view] that strictly speaking there are no corpses, but only 
particles arranged corporeally: ‘corpse eliminativism.’ Talk of corpses is 
no more than a convenient fiction. Talk of corpses persisting through 
time is a fiction too. We can say that a corpse gets smaller when a hand 
falls off, or we can say that it becomes disconnected; but if there are no 
corpses, neither statement will be strictly true. They will be merely 
useful but loose ways of a situation that contains only particles.65  
 
Why not follow Descartes’ lesson and extend the main thrust of “corpse 
eliminativism” to “living-body eliminativism”? Olson anticipates that 
suggestion and has this rebuttal: “Living organisms are metaphysically better 
behaved than nonliving things. That’s why Aristotle and others combine 
something like the life account with the view that the only real composite 
objects are living organisms. (Van Inwagen, 1990, is a detailed defense of this 
view.)”66While a full defense of living-body eliminativism would go beyond the 
parameters of this paper in which the purpose has been to establish the history 
and relevance of the view, a couple of brief remarks on Olson’s objection to 
living-body eliminativism are fitting. First, to appeal to Aristotle’s conception of 
living beings is to reintroduce the natural teleology that Descartes intended to 
replace with his mechanical philosophy that is free of the souls and teleological 
                                                      
65 Olson (2013), p. 94. See also van Inwagen (1990).  
66 Olson (2013), p. 94. 
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functions of Aristotelian physics.67 Simply put, if one accepts Descartes’ move 
to banish appeals to Aristotelian souls, final causes, and hylomorphic substances 
from natural philosophy, then one should be unmoved by Olson’s appeal to 
Aristotle’s conception of life as a point against living-body eliminativism. Of 
note in Descartes’ favour is Feldman’s conclusion upon his consideration of 
Aristotle’s analysis of life that “[i]t seems clear, then, that Aristotle’s version of 
the life-functional approach suffers from some serious problems,” 68  and 
Rosenberg’s denouncement of the “classical failing” of postulating mysterious 
special entities as the only explanations for certain abilities.69 So if not for 
Aristotle’s reasons, what reasons are there for the view that the only real 
composite beings are living beings? As per Olson’s notation, Peter van Inwagen 
does indeed provide a detailed and sustained defense of this view in his book 
Material Beings; however, that defense—and by van Inwagen’s own admission, 
nonetheless—lacks strength. Van Inwagen relies largely on intuitions about 
certain puzzles and paradoxes involving material beings, and when he does 
attempt to prove by argument his thesis that the only real composite beings are 
living beings, he readily admits that the arguments he provides are “rather 
weak.”70 Notably, Descartes’ philosophy factors into that argument in that van 
Inwagen appeals to Descartes’ cogito to establish the existence of the self, albeit 
with a very different nature than what Descartes argues for. Van Inwagen 
adamantly denies the immateriality and simplicity of the Cartesian thinking 
thing, but nonetheless shares Descartes’ intuition that the self exists as a single, 
unified thing. From there, van Inwagen gives no acknowledgement or thought to 
Descartes’ problematization of a materialist concept of life before he proceeds to 
his statement “that what binds [the simples that compose me into a single being] 
is that their activities constitute a life” and, ultimately, to his question-begging 
conclusion that there are no composite material objects other than organisms.71  
There is a longstanding philosophical tradition that associates being with 
living, but it is not easy to prove as much. As such, it is not easy to categorically 
reject Descartes’ lesson of living-body eliminativism. However, the first step 
towards either rejecting it or defending it begins with acknowledging it. That has 
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My goal here has not been to arrive at a final definition of death or to insist 
on a conception of death in order to settle debates about what happens at death. 
Rather, my purpose has been to show that these attempts need to consider the 
possibility that there may be no metaphysical foundation for a reality of life and 
death. On that point, Descartes’ philosophy is instructive. As I have shown in 
this paper, if we follow through with Descartes’ philosophy from the dualism of 
mind and body to the mechanization of life, death really is nothing to no thing. 
Moreover, I do not conclude that this realization is necessarily devastating. 
Among other things, it should not necessarily abolish any moral concerns about 
living and dying. However, what I do contend is that the ontology of functional 
unity must be accounted for in a conceptual analysis of death and, consequently, 
in what is at stake in the concept of death. Contemporary scholarship on the 
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